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Abstract 
 
Individuals frequently choose between accomplishing goals using unaided cognitive 
abilities or offloading cognitive demands onto external tools and resources. For example, 
in order to remember an upcoming appointment one might rely on unaided memory or 
create a reminder by setting a smartphone alert. Setting a reminder incurs both a cost 
(the time/effort to set it up) and a benefit (increased likelihood of remembering). Here 
we investigate whether individuals weigh such costs/benefits optimally or show 
systematic biases. In three experiments, participants performed a memory task where 
they could choose between a) earning a maximum reward for each remembered item, 
using unaided memory, or b) earning a lesser amount per item, using external reminders 
to increase the number remembered. Participants were significantly biased towards using 
external reminders, even when they had a financial incentive to choose optimally. 
Individual differences in this bias were stable over time, and predicted by participants’ 
erroneous metacognitive underconfidence in their memory abilities. Bias was eliminated, 
however, when participants received metacognitive advice about which strategy was 
likely to maximize performance. Furthermore, we found that metacognitive interventions 
(manipulation of feedback valence and practice-trial difficulty) yielded shifts in 
participants’ reminder bias that were mediated by shifts in confidence. However, the bias 
could not be fully attributed to metacognitive error. We conclude that individuals have 
stable biases towards using external versus internal cognitive resources, which result at 
least in part from inaccurate metacognitive evaluations. Finding interventions to mitigate 
these biases can improve individuals’ adaptive use of cognitive tools.  
 
Keywords: prospective memory; metacognition; offloading; reminders; effort 
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A cardinal feature of human cognition is that we often use physical action and external 
resources to reduce the cognitive demands of a task, rather than relying on internal 
processes alone. This is known as cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). For 
example, rather than remembering a piece of information we might use a pen and paper 
to write it down; rather than planning a route we might programme a GPS system to 
guide us; rather than remembering an upcoming appointment we might create a 
reminder by setting a smartphone alert. Using a reminder involves both a cost (the time 
and effort spent setting it up) and a benefit (the increased likelihood of remembering). In 
this article we address the following questions: do individuals weigh the costs and 
benefits of using external tools optimally, or do they show systematic biases towards the 
use of internal or external resources? If such biases are found, how can we explain their 
origins and what might we be able to do to mitigate them? 
 
Minimal memory, soft constraints, and cognitive impartiality 
 
The question of how we weigh decisions between using internal vs external resources has 
been widely discussed by cognitive scientists in recent decades. Some authors suggest 
that the human cognitive system has a drive to use externally represented information, 
and avoid internal memory representations, wherever possible. According to this 
‘minimal memory’ view (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997), decisions are 
systematically biased towards using external resources where possible. A contrasting view 
is the ‘soft constraints’ model presented by Gray et al. (2006). According to this model, 
individuals do not have any systematic bias towards internal or external resources; they 
simply choose whichever option minimises the time taken to achieve a goal. 
While the soft constraints model proposes that time is the only quantity that 
individuals have a drive to minimise, other theoretical frameworks suggest that cognitive 
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effort is intrinsically costly (Shenhav et al., 2017), and therefore individuals strive to 
minimise the amount of effort required to perform a task (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & 
Botvinick, 2010), or to balance it optimally with ‘leisure’ (Kool & Botvinick, 2014). This 
view proposes that individuals will sometimes perform a task less efficiently (e.g. more 
slowly), if this allows them to avoid cognitive effort. This might occur because effort is a 
limited resource that individuals try to conserve (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007), 
although this view has encountered considerable conceptual and empirical challenges in 
recent years (Hagger et al., 2016; Lurquin & Miyake, 2017). An alternative account 
proposes that cognitively effortful tasks are those that involve relatively domain-general 
processes that can only be deployed for a limited number of simultaneous tasks 
(Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013; see also Boureau, Sokol-Hessner, & Daw, 
2015). Exercising cognitive effort on any one activity might therefore be minimized 
because it incurs an opportunity cost: insofar as cognitive effort is being exercised on 
one activity, this precludes its use on another. 
One of the difficulties in evaluating how optimal individuals are at balancing 
internal versus external resources is that the costs of using one or the other strategy are 
generally not directly comparable. For example, there is no obvious scale on which the 
expenditure of cognitive versus physical effort can be compared (though see Chong et 
al., 2017; Potts, Pastel, & Rosenbaum, 2018; Schmidt, Lebreton, Cléry-Melin, Daunizeau, 
& Pessiglione, 2012). Progress in characterising the processes that regulate the allocation 
of mental effort has come from recent studies using the tools of behavioural economics 
(see Kool & Botvinick, 2018 for a recent review). Here we use a similar approach, 
investigating how individuals choose internal versus external strategies based on a single 
metric of task performance. We administered a memory task in which individuals 
repeatedly choose between two options: A) use internal memory processes alone, or B) 
offload memory requirements and improve performance by using external reminders. If 
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they chose to use internal memory processes, participants always earned the maximum 
reward for each item they remembered. If they chose to use external reminders, they 
earned a lesser reward for each correct item, the precise value of which varied from trial 
to trial. Therefore, using reminders involved both a cost (the reduced reward) and a 
benefit (the increased likelihood of remembering). We investigated whether individuals 
weigh these costs and benefits optimally, or show systematic biases. 
 
Sources of bias: Preference versus metacognitive error 
 
In this paradigm, there are at least two potential causes of bias. One possibility would be 
that participants accurately judge the optimal decision to maximise performance, but 
nevertheless choose differently due to a preference towards internal vs external 
resources, even if this leads to suboptimal behaviour according to the reward structure of 
the task. For example, participants might choose to avoid an internal strategy due to its 
greater reliance on effortful internal memory processes. This would be consistent with 
the ‘minimal memory’ view (Ballard et al., 1997).  It would also be compatible with the 
view that individuals avoid effort because it is intrinsically costly (Kool et al., 2010). 
Indeed, a study by Westbrook, Kester & Braver (2013) showed that participants will 
accept a financial penalty in order to perform a less cognitively effortful task. However, 
some authors argue that cognitive effort is not costly in all circumstances and can even 
be rewarding (Inzlicht, Shenhav, & Olivola, 2018). It should be noted that setting an 
external reminder may incur both an effort saving, seeing as it removes the need for 
effortful internal memory processes, and also an effort cost, due to the requirement for 
participants to interrupt their ongoing cognitive activities to set a reminder, before 
switching back to whichever task they were performing. We also note that setting an 
external reminder removes the need to maintain an internal representation, but 
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individuals might continue to maintain one anyway. Therefore reminder-setting likely 
reduces, but does not eliminate, the use of internal memory processes. 
An alternative explanation of bias would be that regardless of any systematic 
preference towards internal versus external strategies, individuals misjudge the efficacy of 
internal vs external strategies due to metacognitive error, i.e. a discrepancy between their 
beliefs about their abilities and their true performance level. For example, an 
underconfident person who believes that their internal memory abilities are poorer than 
they actually are might choose to use external resources not due to a preference for 
accomplishing the task in this way, but simply due to an incorrect belief that their 
performance would be poor otherwise. Consistent with this possibility, Virgo et al. 
(2017) have argued that individuals have a tool-related bias, such that they are 
systematically biased to believe that using external tools will be more efficient than 
internal resources, even when this is not actually true (though see Siegler & Lemaire, 
1997 and Walsh & Anderson, 2009 for evidence of a bias in the opposite direction). 
Further evidence for a metacognitive explanation of bias comes from a study by Dunn, 
Lutes, & Risko (2016) which found that participants selected tasks to perform in 
accordance with their metacognitive evaluations of how demanding they were, rather 
than objective indices of task demand such as response time (see also Dunn, Gaspar, & 
Risko, 2019; Dunn & Risko, 2016). 
It is important to note that these two possibilities are not mutually exclusive. It 
would be quite possible for an individual to be biased towards external strategies both 
due to a bias against cognitive effort, and additionally a metacognitive underconfidence 
in their internal abilities (i.e. lower predicted than actual accuracy). It is also possible that 
a preference to avoid cognitive effort is realised by an individual holding higher 
metacognitive confidence for external resources and/or lower confidence for internal 
ones. Therefore, evidence for a metacognitive influence on selection of internal versus 
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external strategies does not rule out the possibility of a preference to avoid cognitive 
effort. 
 
Intention offloading task 
 
We used a task examining participants’ memory for delayed intentions, adapted from a 
paradigm originally developed by Gilbert (2015a; see also Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; 
Cherkaoui & Gilbert, 2017; Gilbert, 2015b; Landsiedel & Gilbert, 2015; Redshaw, 
Vandersee, Bulley, & Gilbert, 2018). In this task participants are presented with a set of 
numbered circles, which they must drag in numerical order towards the bottom of the 
screen. They are also instructed at the beginning of each trial to drag one or more of the 
circles to an alternative location (e.g. drag ‘5’ to the right). Participants can perform this 
task internally, by remembering the instruction until the appropriate moment (i.e. 
remember the instruction while they drag circles 1-4 to the bottom of the screen, then 
execute it when they reach number 5). Alternatively, they can ‘offload’ the intention by 
dragging the ‘5’ circle towards the right of the screen at the beginning (akin to leaving an 
object by the front door so that you will remember to take it with you when you leave 
the house tomorrow). Subsequently, there is no need to maintain an internal 
representation of the intention, which is cued by the location of the target circle. Gilbert 
(2015a) showed that accuracy on this task significantly predicted participants’ ability to 
fulfil an intention embedded within their everyday life over the period of one week, 
demonstrating significant external validity with respect to real-world prospective memory 
behaviour. The task is similar to standard tests of prospective memory in that it requires 
participants to remember to execute an intended activity after a delay, however the 
duration of this delay period is much shorter than standard tests. Therefore, we prefer 
the more theoretically neutral terminology that this task measures participants’ ability to 
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remember delayed intentions, rather than describing it as a prospective memory task (see 
Gilbert, 2015a for further discussion of this point). 
Previous studies have given participants a free choice whether to set external 
reminders or simply maintain an internal representation of the intention in this task 
(Gilbert, 2015a, 2015b). This allows investigation of the factors that influence 
participants’ choice of one or the other strategy. For example, participants are more likely 
to set external reminders when they have more items to remember or experience 
interruptions during the task, and older adults set more reminders than younger adults 
(Gilbert, 2015a). Previous studies also point to a key role of metacognitive evaluations in 
influencing whether individuals choose to set external reminders or use their own 
memory. In particular, Gilbert (2015b) found that participants with lower confidence in 
their memory abilities were more likely to set external reminders. This held true even 
after statistically controlling for actual memory ability, a finding that was replicated by 
Boldt and Gilbert (2019) both when the offloading strategy was explicitly instructed and 
when it was spontaneously generated by participants. In one experiment (Gilbert 2015b, 
Experiment 2a) there was no relationship between memory confidence and actual ability 
(r = -.01), yet participants with lower confidence were still more likely to set external 
reminders. Furthermore, individuals with lower confidence in their performance of an 
unrelated perceptual discrimination task were also more likely to set external reminders 
in the memory task, even though there was no relationship between performance in the 
two tasks. These findings show that individuals choose to set external reminders based 
on a potentially erroneous metacognitive evaluation of their memory abilities. Regardless 
of their actual memory abilities, participants offload memory demands into the external 
environment insofar as they believe that they will struggle using internal resources alone 
(see Risko & Dunn, 2015; Risko & Gilbert, 2016 for further evidence for a metacognitive 
account of cognitive offloading). This may explain why individuals offload memory 
	 10	
demands even when their performance is already at ceiling without offloading (Risko & 
Dunn, 2015). 
While the studies reviewed above help to identify factors that influence decisions 
to use internal or external resources to achieve a goal, they cannot tell us how optimal 
those decisions are. By considering optimality, we can address both theoretical issues and 
practical ones. The main theoretical issues that we can address relate to cognitive 
impartiality: to what extent can individuals’ biases in strategy selection be attributed to a) 
metacognitive error; b) a preference to avoid cognitive effort; or c) a combination of the 
two? In practical terms, a finding of significant deviations from optimality when 
choosing between internal versus external resources would suggest the importance of 
interventions to reduce these biases. Given that technology gives us frequent 
opportunities to use external resources to supplement memory, navigation, arithmetic, 
and so on, reducing biases towards or against these resources could improve adaptive 
behaviour in everyday life. For example, external reminders can substantially increase the 
ability to remember delayed intentions in individuals with prospective memory 
impairment (Fish, Wilson, & Manly, 2010; Thöne-Otto & Walther, 2008; Wilson, Emslie, 
Quirk, & Evans, 2001). Even amongst non-impaired individuals, there are many 
opportunities to support memory for delayed intentions using devices such as 
smartphone reminders, or personal assistants such as ‘Siri’, ‘Alexa’, and ‘Cortana’ (Graus, 
Bennett, White, & Horvitz, 2016). However, such devices can only help if individuals 
correctly judge the benefit of setting reminders in the first place. 
Two opposing predictions might be made on the basis of previous research in 
this field. One the one hand, laboratory studies investigating metacognitive judgements 
in delayed intention tasks have found that participants are generally underconfident 
about their internal memory abilities (Gilbert, 2015b; Meeks, Hicks, & Marsh, 2007; 
Rummel, Kuhlmann, & Touron, 2013; Schnitzspahn, Zeintl, Jäger, & Kliegel, 2011). This 
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suggests that participants may show a bias towards reminders in the present study. An 
alternative possibility is suggested by a study by Fisher et al. (2015), who found that 
participants with access to an external resource (Google search engine) while completing 
a general knowledge task subsequently believed that they had more knowledge ‘in the 
head’ when performing an unrelated subsequent task. In other words, participants 
seemed to blur the distinction between metacognitive evaluation of what they know vs 
what the internet ‘knows’. This suggests that participants who had previously had access 
to external resources in the form of reminders might subsequently inflate their evaluation 
of their internal memory abilities, leading to a bias towards an internal strategy. 
 
Research aims 
 
In this study we developed a task that allowed us to measure how optimal individuals are 
in a memory task that allows them to choose between external reminders versus unaided 
memory. We addressed three main questions: 1) Do individuals show systematic biases 
towards or away from external memory resources? 2) Are individual differences in these 
biases stable over time? 3) Insofar as individuals do show biases, to what extent can these 
be attributed to a preference towards or against cognitive effort, versus an inaccurate 
metacognitive evaluation of the value (i.e. likely result) of that effort? 
 
Experiment 1 
 
We developed a paradigm that allowed us to evaluate potential bias towards or away 
from external reminders using a memory task based on the intention offloading task 
from earlier studies (Cherkaoui & Gilbert, 2017; Gilbert, 2015a, 2015b; Landsiedel & 
Gilbert, 2015; Redshaw et al., 2018). We tested participants on two occasions, 
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approximately 2-3 weeks apart. This allowed us to test whether individual differences in 
bias are stable over time. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
41 participants took part in the study (13 male; 28 female; mean age: 25.1; range: 18-45). 
They were administered the present task as part of a wider study (see below) and the 
sample size was based on resource availability for this study. Participants were tested on 
two occasions 14 - 24 days apart (M=14.7, SD=2.0). All participants provided informed 
consent before participating and the research was approved by the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee. 
 
	
Figure	1.	Schematic	illustration	of	the	optimal	reminders	task,	and	estimation	of	participants’	
indifference	points. 
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Optimal Reminders task 
 
See Figure 1 for a schematic illustration of the task. Participants viewed six yellow circles 
randomly positioned within a square, on a touchscreen tablet computer. Each circle 
contained a letter of the alphabet, and participants were asked to drag the circles 
sequentially (in alphabetical order) to the bottom of the square. Each time a circle was 
dragged to the bottom of the square, a new circle appeared in its original location, 
continuing the alphabetical sequence (e.g. if letters A-F were on screen, after the A was 
dragged to the bottom it would be replaced with a G). This continued until all letters of 
the alphabet from A-Z had been dragged out of the square. Occasionally, new circles 
initially appeared in blue, orange, or pink, rather than yellow (these were described as 
‘special circles’ in the instructions to participants). These colours correspond with the 
left, top, and right side of the square respectively. Two seconds after appearing on the 
screen, their colour then faded to yellow so that they matched the other circles. When a 
new circle appeared in one of these colours, this represented an instruction that it should 
eventually be dragged to its corresponding side of the square when it is reached in the 
sequence. For example, a participant drags A to the bottom of the screen where it 
disappears. An orange G appears in its place, fading to yellow after 2 seconds. 
Meanwhile, the participant drags circles B-F to the bottom of the screen, before dragging 
G to the top. Therefore, a circle temporarily appearing in a non-yellow colour instructed 
participants to form a delayed intention to drag that circle to a non-standard location 
when it is eventually reached in the sequence. To remember this instruction, participants 
could either rely on an internal representation of their intention, or create an external 
reminder. They created an external reminder by immediately dragging target circles near 
their instructed location when they appeared on the screen. For example, as soon as an 
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orange G appeared on the screen, the participant could drag this circle to near the top of 
the square. Then, when they reached G in the sequence its location would remind the 
participant of their intention. In this case, there was no need to maintain an internal 
representation of the intended behaviour, seeing as it was directly cued by the circle’s 
position. 
One trial consisted of a full 26-letter alphabetical sequence. Within this sequence, 
a total of 10 target circles appeared, randomly allocated to 10 of the letters from G-Z. 
This meant that participants needed to remember multiple simultaneous intentions and it 
was unlikely that they would be able to remember all of them without setting external 
reminders. The 10 target circles were randomly allocated to the left, top, and right 
positions of the square. Feedback was provided as follows: when a target circle was 
correctly dragged to the top, left, or right side of the box, it turned green before 
disappearing. Otherwise, circles dragged to the top, left, or right turned red before 
disappearing. When a circle was dragged to the bottom of the box, it turned purple 
before disappearing regardless of whether it was a target or non-target, which did not 
provide any feedback. For a demonstration of the task, please visit: 
http://samgilbert.net/optimalDemo/start.html. 
 
Procedure 
 
The task was performed on a Samsung SM-T580 Galaxy Tab A tablet computer, using 
the touchscreen interface. Participants were tested individually at the Wellcome Trust 
Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, UK. Alongside the 
optimal reminders task, they completed a battery of other tests as part of a larger project 
investigating the neural basis of metacognitive training. These data will be reported in a 
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separate paper. For the purposes of the present article, we report data from the optimal 
reminders task alone. 
Following a brief practice session, participants performed a total of 17 
experimental trials. On some trials participants were forced to use either an internal 
(unaided memory) or an external (reminder) strategy; on other trials they were free to 
choose. This allowed us to evaluate choice behaviour using the choice/no-choice 
method (Siegler & Lemaire, 1997). In order to force an internal strategy, all circles were 
fixed in position on the screen apart from the next one in the alphabetical sequence, so 
that target circles could not be moved when they first appeared. In order to force an 
external strategy, the computer was programmed so that when a target circle appeared, 
the task could only be continued after the participant moved it within the square. Prior to 
beginning a forced internal or external trial, participants were informed which strategy 
they had to use. 
Participants were told that they scored points every time they dragged one of the 
target circles to the instructed location. On trials where they were forced to use an 
internal or external strategy, they scored 10 points for each correct target response. 
These conditions occurred on trials 2,4,6,8,10,12,14, and 16, alternating between internal 
and external conditions so that there was a total of four trials in each condition (with the 
starting condition counterbalanced between participants, and reversing between the two 
testing sessions). On the remaining nine trials, participants were given a free choice (see 
Figure 1, panel B for an example). They could choose to use an internal strategy for the 
upcoming trial, in which case they scored 10 points per correct target response but were 
prevented from setting external reminders. Alternatively, they could choose to be 
permitted to set reminders in the upcoming trial, in which case they were offered a lower 
number of points for each correct target response. The nine possible values from 1-9 
were offered as the lower value in a random order on these trials. Note that the cost of 
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using a reminder in this paradigm is implicit. Participants were offered choices such as 10 
points to use their own memory versus 7 points to use reminders, rather than being told 
that using reminders would cost 3 points. This is because participants may weigh 
potential gains versus losses differentially due to the well-established phenomenon of 
loss-aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Therefore, we always presented the two 
options in terms of possible rewards, so that they were more directly comparable. 
After each trial, participants were told the total number of points that they had 
scored in the experiment so far. They were told to try to score as many points as 
possible, and that on choice trials they should choose whichever strategy they believed 
would allow them to score more points. 
 
Data analysis 
 
Consider a participant who can correctly respond to an average of 6 out of 10 target 
circles using an internal strategy, and 10 out of 10 targets if allowed to set external 
reminders. Given a choice between 10 points per target with an internal strategy and 9 
points per target with an external strategy, it is rational to choose the external strategy, 
because the expected number of points with the internal strategy (10 points x 6 correct 
responses = 60) is less than the expected number of points with the external strategy (9 
points x 10 correct responses = 90). Likewise, if offered 1 point per target using 
reminders, this would yield an expected score of 10 points per trial, and therefore 
participants should choose the internal strategy instead. Given a choice between scoring 
6 points per target using an external strategy, or 10 points per target using an internal 
strategy, the expected number of points per trial is identical (i.e. 60). Therefore, an 
unbiased individual should be indifferent between these two options if offered a value of 
6 points per target in the external reminder condition. As this example shows, once we 
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know a participant’s mean accuracy when they use each strategy, we can calculate their 
optimal indifference point, i.e. the value attached to target circles in the external reminder 
condition that would lead an unbiased individual to be indifferent between the two 
options. We can then compare this optimal indifference point with their actual 
indifference point, estimated from their behaviour on choice trials, in order to assess 
evidence for bias towards one or other strategy. We refer to the difference between the 
optimal and actual indifference point as the reminder bias. 
Our analytic strategy is as follows. First we calculate the mean accuracy (i.e. mean 
number of target circles correctly dragged to their instructed locations) on forced 
external trials (ACCFE) and forced internal trials (ACCFI). The expected score on forced 
internal trials will be 10 x ACCFI, seeing as targets were always worth 10 points on these 
trials. The optimal indifference point (OIP) is the target value that would lead 
participants to achieve the same score if they are allowed to use reminders, i.e. OIP x 
ACCFE. Therefore: 
 𝑂𝐼𝑃	 ×	𝐴𝐶𝐶() = 10	 ×	𝐴𝐶𝐶(-	 
 
Rearranging, this gives: 
 
𝑂𝐼𝑃 = 	10	 ×	𝐴𝐶𝐶(-𝐴𝐶𝐶()  
 
In order to calculate the actual indifference point, i.e. the value at which participants 
were equally likely to choose an internal or an external strategy, we calculated the 
likelihood of choosing an external vs internal strategy across the full range of external 
target values from 1-9 (Figure 1, panel C). We then fit a sigmoid function to these data 
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using the R package ‘quickpsy’, bounded to the range 1-9 and otherwise using default 
parameters. This allowed us to calculate the value associated with a 50% probability of 
choosing either strategy, according to this function. Note that this approach does not 
require a monotonic relationship between value and strategy choice, e.g. if participants 
accidentally chose an external strategy for one of the low-value choices (see Figure 1 
panel C for an example). Insofar as participants are unbiased between internal and 
external strategies, the optimal and actual indifference points should match. If the actual 
indifference point is higher than the objective indifference point, this would indicate a 
bias towards internal memory because participants would need to be offered a higher 
than optimal amount before deciding to use an external strategy. If the actual 
indifference point is below the objective indifference point, this would indicate a bias 
towards external reminders because participants would be choosing an external reminder 
strategy even when offered a value below the level at which it would be optimal to start 
using reminders. 
Optimal and actual indifference points were calculated separately for each 
participant and session. This is because optimal choice behaviour varies according to 
each participant’s memory abilities. For example, a participant who could score 7/10 
with their own memory and 10/10 with reminders should choose an internal strategy if 
offered 6 points per target to use reminders. But a participant who could score 5/10 with 
their own memory and 10/10 with reminders would score more points using an external 
strategy. By investigating the correlation across participants between actual and objective 
indifference points, we can test whether participants’ strategy choices are sensitive to 
individual differences in memory abilities. Insofar as these two measures are positively 
correlated, this indicates that participants with the most need for reminders (i.e. those 
with poorer memory abilities) do indeed choose to use reminders more often.   
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Results 
 
See Figure 2 for a summary of results. Participants were only able to remember 
approximately half of the targets using their own memory in the forced internal 
condition (session 1: M=52.3%, SD=15.4; session 2: M=55.1%, SD=16.0), but nearly all 
of them when they used external reminders in the forced external condition (session 1: 
M=94.0%, SD=6.9; session 2: M=97.9%, SD=3.4). Additionally, there was a small 
improvement in accuracy from session 1 to session 2. The high level of performance in 
the external condition suggests that memory failures in the internal condition were 
unlikely to be caused by participants simply failing to notice the colour-change of target 
circles, seeing as the timings for this colour-change were the same in both conditions. 
These data were analysed in a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with factors Session and 
Condition, showing significant main effects of Condition (F(1,40)=455, p < 10-15, h2p = 
.92) and Session (F(1,40)=9.7, p = .003, h2p = .20), but no significant interaction (F<1).  
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Figure	2.	Behavioural	results	from	Experiment	1.	Data	from	session	1	is	shown	on	the	left	and	
session	2	on	the	right.	Top	row	shows	mean	accuracy	in	the	forced	internal	(unaided	memory)	and	
forced	external	(reminder)	conditions,	along	with	optimal	and	actual	indifference	points.	Error	bars	
represent	within-subject	confidence	intervals	such	that	nonoverlapping	bars	indicate	p	<	.05.	Middle	
row	shows	the	likelihood	of	participants	choosing	to	use	reminders	when	target	values	from	1-9	
were	attached	to	this	choice.	Mean	indifference	points	(IPs)	based	on	this	graph	are	also	shown.	
Bottom	row	presents	each	participant’s	optimal	and	actual	indifference	point.	The	diagonal	line	
represents	perfect	calibration	between	the	two	(i.e.	actual=optimal).	Points	below	this	line	indicate	
excessive	use	of	reminders	(actual	<	optimal);	points	above	the	line	indicate	inadequate	use	of	
reminders	(actual	>	optimal). 
 
These accuracies imply mean optimal indifference points of 5.5 and 5.6 in the two 
sessions, however the actual indifference points were lower: 4.5 and 4.8 respectively, 
indicating excessive use of reminders. In both sessions, this discrepancy between optimal 
and actual indifference points (i.e. reminder bias) was significant (session 1: t(40) = 3.25, 
p = .002, d = 1.0; session 2: t(40) = 2.61, p = .013, d = .82), however the bias did not 
differ significantly between sessions (t(40) = .76, p = .45, d = .24).  
In both sessions there were significant correlations between optimal and actual 
indifference points (session 1: r = .47, p = .002; session 2: r = .32, p = .045). Therefore, 
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although participants were biased towards excessive use of reminders, nevertheless 
individuals who benefitted the most from reminders were more likely to use them. 
Additionally, there was a significant correlation between the bias scores in the two 
sessions (r = .47, p = .002; Figure 3).  
 
	
Figure	3.	Correlation	of	bias	scores	between	the	two	sessions,	along	with	trendline. 
 
In a final set of analyses we investigated the mean duration to complete each trial in the 
forced internal and forced external conditions. This allows us to test whether it took 
systematically longer to complete the task using one or the other strategy. In session 1, 
the mean completion time was significantly longer in the external condition (M=61.2s, 
SD=10.4s) than the internal condition (M=50.4s, SD=17.8s; t(40) = 3.5, p = .001, d = 
1.1). However, there was no significant difference in session 2 (external: M=51.7s, 
SD=8.5s; internal: M=49.9s, SD=18.2s; t(40) = .58, p =.56, d = .18). 
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Discussion 
 
This study found clear evidence of bias: in both testing sessions, participants tended to 
use more reminders than would have been optimal.  Despite this significant bias, 
correlational analyses showed a significant relationship between objective and actual 
indifference points in the two sessions. This shows that participants who derived the 
most benefit from reminders also were most likely to use them. Furthermore, bias was 
also correlated between the two sessions. Therefore, individual biases towards external 
reminders vs internal memory processes were stable over time. 
While the present results show clear evidence for a bias towards external 
reminders, the cause of this bias is unclear. We can exclude the possibility that 
participants simply chose the strategy that minimised the time taken to complete the task 
(Gray et al., 2006), seeing as the preferred external strategy either took longer than the 
internal strategy (session 1) or the same amount of time (session 2). We can also exclude 
the possibility that participants’ choices were biased due to a form of loss aversion, 
seeing as the preferred strategy was, if anything, associated with a loss (i.e. reduced 
reward for each correctly remembered target). However, at least two other explanations 
remain. One possibility is that the human cognitive system is intrinsically biased away 
from internal memory processes or cognitive effort, such that individuals would choose a 
suboptimal strategy (in terms of the reward structure of the task) in order to conform to 
this bias. We refer to this as the ‘intrinsic bias’ account. Alternatively (or in addition), 
individuals might choose sub-optimally due to a metacognitive miscalibration, such that 
they exaggerate their internal memory limitations regardless of any intrinsic bias towards 
or away from memory use, tool use, or effort. We refer to this as the ‘metacognitive bias’ 
	 23	
account. The purpose of experiment 2 was to evaluate how well these accounts can 
explain the results of experiment 1. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
This experiment repeated the procedure of Experiment 1 with three key changes. First, 
participants earned a payment based on the number of points they scored: they therefore 
had a direct financial incentive to make optimal choices. This allowed us to test whether 
participants still show biases, even when they have a clear financial incentive to avoid 
them. However, it does not distinguish between the intrinsic bias and metacognitive bias 
accounts, neither of which predicts that a financial incentive would necessarily remove 
any bias: there is no reason to think that a financial incentive would necessarily remove 
metacognitive bias, and the intrinsic bias account allows for the possibility that 
participants may, in effect, accept a financial penalty in return for reduced reliance on 
internal memory processes or effort. In other words, they would be paying to avoid 
cognitive effort (see Westbrook et al., 2013 for an example of this). In order to evaluate 
this possibility, we tested two groups of participants. One group received metacognitive 
advice as they performed the experiment. They were informed on each trial whether it 
would be optimal to choose an internal or an external strategy, based on their 
performance so far. However, it was also emphasised that they were free to choose 
whichever option they preferred. If participants have an intrinsic bias against cognitive 
effort (but no metacognitive bias), providing metacognitive advice should not affect this 
bias. Conversely, if bias towards reminders is caused by metacognitive underconfidence 
(but no intrinsic bias beyond this), then providing metacognitive advice should eliminate 
it. We additionally collected metacognitive judgements from participants in this 
experiment, so that they provided a self-evaluation of how well they could perform the 
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task. This allowed us to test an additional prediction of the metacognitive bias account, 
that participants’ bias towards external reminders should be correlated with their 
underconfidence in internal memory abilities. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
  
108 participants took part in the study (mean age: 31, range 18-80, SD=14.5, 68 female, 
40 male). This was based on a power calculation showing that 80% power to detect a 
between-group difference with medium effect size (d = 0.5) requires at least 102 
participants (one-tailed test, seeing as there was a directional hypothesis that providing 
metacognitive advice should, if anything, reduce bias). This effect size approximately 
matches the effect size that would be expected for a between-group comparison if the 
reminder bias shown by participants in session 1 of Experiment 1 was compared with 
another group where the bias was reduced to zero but the standard deviation was 
unchanged (d = 0.51). Participants were randomly allocated to two groups: advised (55 
participants) and unadvised (53 participants). These groups did not differ significantly in 
age (t(95.5)=1.3, p = .21) or gender (χ2 = .02, p = .88). All participants provided 
informed consent before participating and the research was approved by the UCL 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Procedure 
 
The optimal reminder task was based on experiment 1, with six modifications. First, the 
trial ordering was adjusted. Rather than interspersing the forced internal and forced 
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external trials throughout the experiment, participants alternated between forced internal 
and forced external trials for the first eight trials of the experiment (with the condition 
for the first trial counterbalanced between participants), followed by the nine choice 
trials. This allowed estimation of each participant's optimal indifference point before the 
first choice trial. Note that this means that indifference bias scores could potentially be 
inaccurate, seeing as they no longer control for potential practice effects. However, this 
would apply to all participants equally, so could not account for any group difference in 
the reminder bias. 
Second, each time that participants in the advised group made a choice between 
internal and external strategies, they were provided with metacognitive advice. 
Throughout the experiment, the computer kept track of participants' accuracy when they 
used internal and external strategies, averaging across all trials (forced and choice). This 
allowed the optimal indifference point to be calculated, and compared with the target 
value offered with reminders on choice trials. When participants in the advised group 
were first instructed about choice trials they were given the following information on the 
computer screen: "We have been calculating your accuracy on the task so far. This means 
that we can make a prediction which option is likely to score you most points, based on 
your performance until now. You will be told this prediction each time you do the task, 
which may help you to decide whether to do the task with or without reminders. 
However, you are free to choose whichever option is best - it is completely up to you". 
On each choice trial they were then given the following information: "According to your 
performance so far, we have calculated that you will probably score more points if you 
choose to perform [with/without] reminders. However, you may choose whichever 
option you prefer." If the target value with reminders was equal to the optimal 
indifference point, they were told "According to your performance so far, you will score 
the same number of points regardless of whether you choose to use reminders or not".  
	 26	
A third modification was that we collected participants' metacognitive judgments 
before the experimental choice trials started. Following the eight forced internal/external 
trials, they were given the following instructions: "Now that you have had some practice 
with the experiment, we would like you to tell us how accurately you can perform the 
task when you do it without using any reminders. Please use the scale below to indicate 
what percentage of the special circles you can correctly drag to the instructed side of the 
square, on average. 100% would mean that you always get every single one correct. 0% 
would mean that you can never get any of them correct". They inputted their answer by 
dragging a slider on the screen, which displayed the exact percentage they had selected. 
When they were satisfied with their selection, they were asked "Now, please tell us how 
accurately you can perform the task with reminders. As before, 100% would mean that 
you always get every special circle correct. 0% would mean that you can never get any of 
them correct". 
The fourth modification was that participants earned money on the basis of the 
points scored during the task. They were told that for every 100 points, they would 
receive £0.30 payment. This translates as performance-related payment of up to £5.10, in 
addition to a base payment of £5 for taking part. 
The fifth modification was that instead of using letters of the alphabet (A-Z) 
inside the circles, we used numbers (01 – 25) instead. This was because some participants 
in Experiment 1 reported that they sometimes found it difficult to keep track of the 
alphabetical sequence. As before, 10 targets were embedded within each sequence. 
The final modification was that on each trial a timer was shown on the screen, 
counting down from three minutes. This encouraged participants to complete the task 
reasonably quickly. When this was completed, participants undertook some additional 
tasks as part of a separate project (Bird, Tsai, & Gilbert, in prep), beyond the scope of 
the present work. 
	 27	
 
Results 
 
See Figure 4 for a summary of results. Mean trial duration in the forced internal 
condition (advised group: 56.6s, SD=28.0; unadvised group: M=57.0s, SD=22.1) was 
similar to the forced external condition (advised group: M=56.3s, 15.8; unadvised group: 
M=63.7s, SD=22.6; effect of condition: F(1,106) = 1.6, p = .21, h2p = .01). 
As in Experiment 1, accuracy in the forced internal condition (advised group: M=57.5%, 
SD=16.5; unadvised group: M=54.6%, SD=16.5) was much lower than the forced 
external condition (advised group: 94.0%, SD=7.2; unadvised group: 92.4%, SD=9.0). 
These data were analysed in a Condition (forced internal vs forced external) x Group 
(advised, unadvised) ANOVA, showing a main effect of Condition (F(1, 106) = 786, p < 
10-15, h2p =.88), but no main effect of Group or Group x Condition interaction (F(1,106) 
< 1.2, p > .28, h2p < .01). The total number of points scored by the advised group 
(M=1210, SD=188) was higher than the number of points scored by the unadvised 
group (M=1171, SD=203), however this difference was not statistically significant 
(t(104.7) = 1.0, p = .30, d = .21). 
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Figure	4.	Behavioural	results	from	Experiment	2.	Data	from	the	unadvised	group	is	shown	on	the	left	
and	the	advised	group	on	the	right.	Top	row	shows	mean	accuracy	in	the	forced	internal	(unaided	
memory)	and	forced	external	(reminder)	conditions,	along	with	optimal	and	actual	indifference	
points.	Error	bars	represent	within-subject	confidence	intervals	such	that	nonoverlapping	bars	
indicate	p	<	.05.	Middle	row	shows	the	likelihood	of	participants	choosing	to	use	reminders	when	
target	values	from	1-9	were	attached	to	this	choice.	Mean	indifference	points	(IPs)	based	on	this	
graph	are	also	shown.	Bottom	row	presents	each	participant’s	optimal	and	actual	indifference	point.	
The	diagonal	line	represents	perfect	calibration	between	the	two	(i.e.	actual=optimal).	Points	below	
this	line	indicate	excessive	use	of	reminders	(actual	<	optimal);	points	above	the	line	indicate	
inadequate	use	of	reminders	(actual	>	optimal). 
 
 
In the unadvised group, the optimal and actual indifference points were 5.8 and 5.1 
respectively. This discrepancy indicated a significant bias towards reminders, replicating 
the findings of Experiment 1 (t(52) = 3.6, p = .0008, d = .98). In the advised group, the 
optimal and actual indifference points were both 6.1 and there was no significant bias 
(t(54) = .3, p = .73, d = .09). The difference in reminder bias between groups was 
significant (t(105) = 2.8, p = .003, d = .55; NB this p value is for a one-tailed test, in 
accordance with the original power calculation). In both groups, the optimal and actual 
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indifference points were significantly correlated (unadvised: r = .71, p < 10-8; advised: r = 
.67, p < 10-7). 
Turning now to the metacognitive judgements, results are shown in Figure 5. 
Consistent with earlier studies of prospective memory tasks (Gilbert, 2015b; Meeks et al., 
2007; Rummel et al., 2013; Schnitzspahn, Zeintl, et al., 2011), participants were 
underconfident in their self-judgements of accuracy using internal memory (advised 
group: t(54) = 3.6, p < .001, d = .98; unadvised group: t(52) = 4.3, p < .0001, d = 1.2). 
In addition, participants were underconfident in their self-judgements of accuracy using 
external reminders (advised group: t(54) = 3.4, p = .001, d = .93; unadvised group: t(52) 
= 4.45, p  < .0001, d = 1.23). However, the latter predictions are hard to interpret, seeing 
as they may result from a combination of both participants’ general confidence in their 
own ability to perform the task, along with confidence in the reliability of external 
support (see Gilbert, 2015b for discussion). The key prediction of the metacognitive bias 
account is that participants’ bias in the choice trials should correlate with their 
underconfidence in the forced internal condition. This correlation was indeed obtained 
(r(51) = -.31, p = .026; NB the correlation coefficient is negative seeing as 
underconfidence results in a negative score whereas reminder bias results in a positive 
score). Therefore, to the extent that participants erroneously believed their internal 
memory processes to be inadequate, they showed a bias towards external reminders. No 
such correlation was seen in the advised group (r(53) = -.02, p = .89). 
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Figure	5.	Top:	metacognitive	judgements	of	accuracy,	along	with	actual	accuracy,	in	the	unadvised	
(left)	and	advised	(right)	groups.		Error	bars	represent	within-subject	confidence	intervals	such	that	
nonoverlapping	bars	indicate	p	<	.05.	Bottom:	relationship	between	individuals’	metacognitive	bias	
and	reminder	bias.	Metacognitive	bias	predicts	reminder	bias	in	the	unadvised	group,	but	not	in	the	
advised	group. 
 
As demonstrated above, unadvised participants’ choice behaviour deviated 
significantly from optimal, where optimal choices were calculated based on their accuracy 
in the forced internal and forced external conditions. We also analysed whether their 
choice behaviour deviated from optimal choice behaviour based on their metacognitive 
predictions of accuracy in the internal and external conditions rather than objective 
accuracy. To do this, we calculated each participant’s indifference point in the same 
manner as their objective indifference point but using each participant’s self-judged 
accuracy rather than objective accuracy in the internal and external conditions. This 
indifference point (M=5.33, SD=2.44) did not differ significantly from the actual 
indifference point (M=5.10, SD=2.17; t(52) = .74, p = .46, d = .21). Therefore, 
unadvised participants’ choice behaviour did not deviate significantly from optimal based 
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on their predictions of their accuracy in the two conditions, but it did deviate from 
optimal based on their actual accuracy. 
 
Discussion 
 
In participants who were not given metacognitive advice, this experiment replicated the 
bias towards excessive reminder use seen in Experiment 1. This bias was seen even 
though there was a financial incentive to behave optimally. However, when 
metacognitive advice was given, the reminder bias was eliminated. Furthermore, the 
extent of individuals' reminder bias was predicted by their underconfidence in their 
internal memory abilities. Both of these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the reminder bias arises from inaccurate metacognitive evaluation of internal memory 
abilities. 
There was no evidence for an intrinsic bias against internal memory or 
cognitively effortful processes, seeing as there was no reminder bias in the advised group. 
Therefore, even if individuals avoid cognitive effort as a default, this bias need not be 
seen in all circumstances. However, it is unclear whether simply removing metacognitive 
underconfidence is sufficient to eliminate the bias towards excessive reminders in all 
circumstances. It could be argued that as well as the elimination of metacognitive error 
(through the provision of advice), the advised group also had at least two other factors 
that predisposed them towards unbiased decisions: a) a financial incentive to choose 
optimally, and b) a reduced cognitive demand, seeing as they could potentially perform 
the task by accepting advice, without having to deliberate over the correct strategy on 
each trial. It is possible that without these two factors, individuals might be biased 
towards reminders even without metacognitive underconfidence. It is also logically 
possible that there was no influence of metacognitive error on reminder bias at all, and 
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that the difference in bias between the two groups simply reflected the difference in 
cognitive demand. This would be difficult to reconcile with the correlation between 
metacognitive error and reminder bias in the unadvised group. However seeing as there 
were only 53 participants in this group, a sample size at which correlations may be 
unstable (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013), confidence in this finding would be increased if 
it were replicated in a larger sample. 
 
Experiment 3 
 
This experiment investigated whether it is possible to find metacognitive interventions 
which influence participants’ confidence in their internal memory abilities, and if so 
whether these interventions have parallel influence on reminder bias. If such a parallel 
influence were found, this would provide strong evidence for a metacognitive influence 
on reminder bias, because any variation in reminder bias would be observed without a 
concomitant difference in cognitive load, unlike Experiment 2.  This experiment also 
allowed us to investigate whether reminder bias can be observed even in the absence of 
metacognitive underconfidence. Such a finding would suggest that removing 
underconfidence is not sufficient to eliminate reminder bias, and that other factors (e.g. 
financial incentive, reduced cognitive demand) need to be present in order to observe 
unbiased decisions. Thus we investigated two main questions: 1) do interventions that 
shift metacognitive judgements also shift reminder bias? If so, this provides strong 
evidence for a metacognitive influence on reminder bias; 2) can reminder bias be 
observed even in the absence of underconfidence? If so, this shows that metacognitive 
error cannot explain reminder bias in full. 
 We manipulated two factors in a between-subject design. The first was feedback 
valence: half of the participants received positively framed feedback about their 
	 33	
performance and the other half received negatively framed feedback. We predicted that 
negative feedback would make participants less confident in their ability to perform the 
task (see Raaijmakers, Baars, Schaap, Paas, & van Gog, 2017 for a related finding). The 
second factor we manipulated was the difficulty of the practice trials: half of the 
participants began with easy trials and half began with difficult trials, but after this all 
participants received experimental trials of the same difficulty. We predicted that initially 
performing an easier version of the task would yield a “metacognitive contrast” effect 
whereby subsequent trials would seem relatively hard, making participants less confident 
(see Pansky & Goldsmith, 2014 for a related finding). However, we considered that an 
opposite effect might also be possible, whereby initially performing a harder version of 
the task would lead to a “carryover” of decreased confidence, leading to lower 
confidence on the experimental trials. The key theoretical prediction, regardless of 
whether increased practice difficulty leads to lower or higher subsequent confidence, was 
that any manipulation that reduces confidence will make participants more biased 
towards using reminders (and vice versa). Before commencing data collection we pre-
registered our hypotheses, experimental procedure, and analysis plans 
(http://osf.io/e84p2). 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
As specified in our pre-registered plan, we aimed for a final sample of 67 participants in 
each experimental group, so that comparisons between groups would have 80% power 
to replicate the smallest effect reported in the studies of Raaijmakers et al. (2017) and 
Pansky & Goldsmith (2014). This was an effect size of d = .49 (Raaikmakers et al., 2017, 
Experiment 2). We tested a total of 315 participants in order to reach our final sample of 
	 34	
268 participants (67 in each group) after applying our pre-registered exclusion criteria. 
These exclusion criteria were designed to ensure that despite online data collection, 
outliers were removed and all included participants performed the task with a reasonable 
level of accuracy and chose strategies rationally (i.e. more likely to set external reminders 
when this earned more points). Participants were excluded for the following reasons: a) 
failing to show increased accuracy in the forced external than the forced internal 
condition (n=17); b) lower than 10% accuracy in the forced internal condition (n=5); c) 
lower than 70% accuracy in the forced external condition (n=12); d) negative correlation 
between target value and likelihood of choosing to use reminders, suggesting random or 
counter-rational strategy choice behaviour (n=6); reminder bias score more than 2.5 
standard deviations from the group mean (n=5); metacognitive bias score more than 2.5 
standard deviations from the group mean (n=2). The final sample had mean age 37 
(range=21-70; SD=11; 152 male, 115 female, 1 other). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website to take part in the 
experiment, completing the tasks using their computer’s web browser (for a 
demonstration, see: “http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sam-gilbert/CS1/Demo/WebTasks.html”) 
We restricted participants to those located in the USA to reduce variability. The 
experimental task was akin to the one used in Experiment 2 in the sense that each trial 
involved 25 numbered circles rather than using letters. In most other respects the 
procedure was identical to Experiment 1 (e.g. forced internal and forced external trials 
were interspersed amongst the following sequence of 17 trials, to control for practice 
effects). However, the following modifications were made from the earlier experiments: 
 First, participants received a feedback screen after each trial. For example, 
participants in the positive feedback condition might receive a message such as “Well 
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done – excellent work! You responded correctly to most of the special circles”, whereas a 
participant in the negative feedback condition might receive a message such as “Room 
for improvement. You got some of the special circles wrong” (for a full description of 
the feedback, see Table 1). Importantly, although this feedback was framed differently 
between the positive and negative conditions, it was always veridical and did not deceive 
participants. 
 Second, we manipulated the difficulty of the practice trials. Prior to commencing 
the experimental trials, participants performed five trials that contained either 4 targets 
(easy-practice condition) or 16 targets (difficult-practice condition). Following this, they 
were told that the task would now get more difficult (easy-practice condition) or easy 
(difficult-practice condition). They were also told: “It will stay like this for the rest of the 
experiment. Please ignore the difficulty of the practice trials you have just done and 
remember that the task will be like this from now on”. 
After a further trial containing 10 targets (which was the standard procedure 
from now on), they were asked to provide a metacognitive judgement of their unaided 
ability to perform the task with the following instructions: “Now that you have had some 
practice with the experiment, we would like you to tell us how accurately you can 
perform the task. Please ignore the earlier practice trials and just tell us how accurately 
you can do the task when it is the same difficulty as the trial you have just completed. 
The difficulty will stay the same as this for the rest of the experiment. Please use the scale 
below to indicate what percentage of the special circles you can correctly drag to the 
instructed side of the square, on average. 100% would mean that you always get every 
single one correct. 0% would mean that you can never get any of them correct.” After 
this, participants were introduced to the offloading strategy, the procedure for scoring 
points, and choosing whether or not to use reminders, in the same manner as 
Experiment 1. Then they completed the 17 experimental trials. 
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 Participants were randomly allocated into four groups, crossing the factors of 
feedback valance and practice difficulty. Like Experiment 1 (but not Experiment 2), 
points were not linked to any financial reward, and all participants received a flat 
payment of $7.50 for taking part.  
Accuracy Feedback (Positive 
condition) 
Feedback (Negative condition) 
0% You did not get any special 
circles correct this time. 
Room for improvement. You got 
all of the special circles wrong. 
Above 0%, 
below 50% 
Well done – good work! You 
are responding well to the 
special circles. 
Room for improvement. You got 
most of the special circles wrong. 
Above 50%, 
below 100% 
Well done – excellent work! 
You responded correctly to 
most of the special circles.  
Room for improvement. You got 
some of the special circles wrong. 
100% Well done – perfect! You 
responded correctly to all of the 
special circles. 
You did not get any of the special 
circles wrong this time. 
Table	1.	Feedback	provided	in	the	positive	and	negative	conditions. 
 
 
Results 
 
  
Easy practice, 
positive feedback 
Easy practice, 
negative feedback 
Difficult practice, 
positive feedback 
Difficult practice, 
negative feedback 
Forced external % correct 96.6 (4.8) 95.9 (5.9) 97.7 (4.1) 96.9 (5.7) 
Forced internal % correct 56.5 (16.2) 58.2 (19.4) 59.2 (17.0) 60.6 (19.6) 
Mean confidence 65.9 (23.2) 52.5 (26.8) 53.1 (29.1) 49.1 (34.9) 
Metacognitive bias 9.3 (27.2) -5.6 (28.4) -6.2 (29.5) -11.4 (36.7) 
OIP 5.8 (1.6) 6.0 (1.9) 6.1 (1.7) 6.2 (1.9) 
AIP 4.7 (2.5) 4.2 (2.5) 4.2 (2.6) 3.4 (2.8) 
Reminder bias 1.2 (2.7) 1.8 (2.4) 1.9 (2.0) 2.9 (3.1) 
Table	2.	Behavioural	results	from	Experiment	3,	in	each	of	the	four	groups.	Table	shows	means	with	
standard	deviations	in	parentheses.	OIP	=	optimal	indifference	point;	AIP	=	actual	indifference	
point. 
 
See Table 2 for a summary of results. We first investigated accuracy in the forced internal 
and forced external conditions, in a mixed ANOVA with factors Condition (internal, 
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external), Practice-Difficulty (easy, difficult), and Feedback-Valence (positive, negative). 
There was a significant main effect of Condition (F(1,264) = 1380, p < .0001, h2p = .84 ), 
but the effect of the Practice-Difficulty and Feedback-Valence manipulations, and their 
interactions, were all non-significant (F(1,264) < 2.1, p > .15, h2p < .01 ). Therefore, 
while using reminders significantly increased accuracy (as in the earlier experiments), 
there was no significant influence of the metacognitive interventions on task 
performance. 
 Next, we investigated metacognitive judgements by subjecting participants’ 
predicted unaided accuracy to an ANOVA with factors Practice-Difficulty and 
Feedback-Valence. There were significant main effects of both Practice-Difficulty 
(F(1,264) = 5.3, p = .02, h2p = .02) and Feedback-Valence (F(1,264) = 6.0, p = .02, h2p = 
.02), but no significant interaction (F(1,264) = 1.8, p = .18, h2p < .01). Participants’ 
confidence was increased if they had easier practice trials, and/or positive feedback. We 
also investigated participants’ metacognitive bias, that is, the difference between their 
metacognitive prediction and actual accuracy in the forced internal condition. This bias 
score also showed significant main effects of Practice-Difficulty (F(1,264) = 8.0, p = 
.005, h2p = .03) and Feedback-Valence (F(1,268) = 7.2, p = .007, h2p = .03) but no 
significant interaction (F(1,264) = 1.7, p = .20, h2p < .01). We compared each group’s 
bias score against zero with one-sample t-tests, which showed that participants in the 
Easy, Positive group were significantly over-confident (i.e. their predicted accuracy levels 
were significantly greater than actual accuracy; t(66) = 2.8, p = .007, d = .69). Predicted 
accuracy was slightly underconfident but not significantly different from zero in the 
Easy, Negative (t(66) = 1.6, p = .11, d = .40) and Difficult, Positive (t(66) = 1.7, p = .09, 
d = .42) groups. Participants in the Difficult, Negative group were significantly 
underconfident (t(66) = 2.5, p = .013, d = .63). 
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 We investigated the reminder bias in a similar manner to metacognitive bias. 
There were significant main effects of both Practice-Difficulty (F(1,264) = 7.9, p = .005, 
h2p = .03) and Feedback-Valence (F(1,264) = 6.5, p = .01, h2p = .02), but no significant 
interaction (F(1,264) = .4, p = .53, h2p < .01). One-sample t-tests showed that 
participants in all four groups were significantly biased towards excessive use of 
reminders (t(55) > 3.5, p < .001, d > .87 in each group). However, the bias was more 
than twice as large in the Difficult, Negative group than it was in the Easy, Positive 
group. The relationship between metacognitive bias and reminder bias, in each of the 
four groups, is shown in Figure 6. 
 In order to investigate the relationship between metacognitive bias and reminder 
bias, we conducted a linear regression analysis with a dependent variable of the reminder 
bias and the following factors: Practice-Difficulty, Feedback-Valence, Practice-Difficulty 
x Feedback-Valence interaction, and metacognitive bias. This showed a significant effect 
of metacognitive bias (β = -.029, SE = .005, t(263) = 5.8, p < 10-7), providing strong 
evidence that the reminder bias is related to metacognitive bias, even after statistically 
controlling for any direct influence of the metacognitive interventions. However, in this 
analysis there was no longer a significant effect of practice difficulty (β = .29, SE = .15, 
t(263) = 1.9, p = .054) or feedback valence (β = .26, SE = .15, t(263) = 1.7, p = .09), nor 
was the practice difficulty x feedback valence interaction significant (β = .17, SE = .15, 
t(263) = 1.1, p = .26).  Therefore, there was no longer a direct effect of the 
metacognitive interventions on reminder bias when metacognitive judgements were 
included in the model. We additionally conducted a pair of mediation analyses using 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2017), investigating practice difficulty and feedback valence 
separately. Unlike the analyses above, these were not included in our pre-registered 
analysis plan. The analyses showed a significant indirect effect on reminder bias of both 
practice difficulty (β = .16, SE = .06, Z = 2.5, p = .01) and feedback valence (β = .15, SE 
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= .06, Z = 2.4, p = .02), mediated by metacognitive judgements. Given that the direct 
influence of these interventions on reminder bias were nonsignificant, these results 
suggest that their effects were fully mediated by their influence on metacognitive 
judgements. 
 
 
Figure 6. Relationship between metacognitive bias and reminder bias in the four groups. 
Horizontal margin shows boxplots for the metacognitive bias in each group, and vertical 
margin shows boxplots for the reminder bias. Grey line indicates linear regression for the 
relationship between the two variables, across all participants.  
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Discussion 
Both practice difficulty and feedback valence influenced participants’ metacognitive 
beliefs about their memory abilities, without influencing actual performance levels. These 
effects were accompanied by parallel shifts in participants’ reminder bias, which were 
significantly mediated by metacognitive judgements. Insofar as a manipulation made 
participants less confident in their memory, it made them more biased towards 
reminders. We also found a significant relationship between individuals’ metacognitive 
and reminder biases, replicating a similar result from the unadvised group of Experiment 
2. These findings strongly support the hypothesis that metacognitive judgements 
influence individual biases towards or away from external reminders, and that 
metacognitive interventions can modify such biases. 
 A second question addressed in this experiment was whether metacognitive 
biases are sufficient to explain the reminder bias. We found that one group of 
participants (Easy, Positive) was significantly overconfident in its metacognitive 
judgements, while another group (Difficult, Negative) was significantly underconfident. 
However, both groups were biased towards external reminders, albeit with the bias in the 
latter group being more than twice as large as the former. This shows that metacognitive 
underconfidence is not necessary in order to observe a reminder bias, seeing as it is 
possible to see a bias towards reminders even in participants who are overconfident in 
their memory abilities. Therefore, our results show that metacognitive judgements 
contribute to the reminder bias, but the bias cannot be exhaustively explained by 
metacognitive error. 
 
 
General Discussion 
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Cognitive tools such as external reminders carry both costs (e.g. the time/effort spent 
setting them up) and benefits (e.g. the increased likelihood of remembering). In this 
study we investigated how optimally participants weigh such costs and benefits by giving 
them a free choice between earning a maximum reward for each remembered item using 
their own memory, or a lesser reward using external reminders. Participants chose to set 
external reminders more often than would be optimal, even when they had a financial 
incentive to choose optimally. This reminder bias was large in magnitude (Cohen's d > 
0.8 each time the bias was observed) and individual differences were stable over time. 
Participants’ metacognitive evaluations of internal memory abilities predicted these 
individual differences, and the bias was eliminated when participants were provided with 
metacognitive advice that specified which decision was likely to be optimal. We therefore 
conclude that individuals show systematic biases in their use of external cognitive 
resources versus internal processes, and these biases are related to metacognitive 
judgements of confidence (consistent with the metacognitive model of cognitive 
offloading presented by Risko & Gilbert, 2016). We also found that bias cannot be 
exhaustively explained by metacognitive error, i.e. the discrepancy between predicted and 
actual ability, seeing as it could be observed in the context of both under- and over-
confidence. Therefore other factors such as a preference to avoid cognitive effort may 
play a role too. 
These results have clear practical implications regarding the use of cognitive tools 
in everyday life. With the advent of modern technology, we have continual opportunities 
to offload cognitive processes into external devices. However, it is clearly not optimal to 
always do so, leading necessarily to cost/benefit decisions. For example, it would not be 
optimal to set reminders for every activity that we intend to do, regardless of its 
importance or the likelihood that we would remember it anyway (e.g. to eat, sleep, or 
perform activities that are part of well-established daily routines). Our results suggest that 
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individuals may make such cost/benefit decisions suboptimally as a result of 
metacognitive error. They also suggest that such decisions may be improved if methods 
could be found to improve individuals' metacognitive accuracy. 
In many cases, over-use of a cognitive tool will not lead to any harmful effects. 
However, in some safety-critical fields over-reliance on an external tool can have 
disastrous consequences. In one case, aeroplane pilots trusted the ability of the autopilot 
and failed to intervene and take manual control, even as the autopilot crashed the Airbus 
A320 they were flying; in another, an automated cruise ship navigation system 
malfunctioned and the crew failed to intervene, allowing the ship to drift off course for 
24 hours before it ran aground (Lee & See, 2004). As a result of cases like these, 
researchers in the field of human factors have paid particular attention to the 
phenomenon of ‘automation complacency’ (insufficient monitoring  of whether an 
external tool is operating adequately) and ‘automation bias’ (individuals' excessive trust in 
the capabilities of automatic tools; see Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010 for a review). It has 
been hypothesised that trust (in the abilities of an external tool) and confidence (in one’s 
own abilities) are key factors driving such biases (Lee & See, 2004). The present results 
directly support this view (see Weis & Wiese, 2019, for further supporting evidence). 
We found that bias was eliminated in the advised group of Experiment 2. 
However, participants in Experiment 3 were biased towards reminders regardless of 
whether their metacognitive judgments were under- or over-confident. Therefore, while 
participants in Experiment 3 were biased towards reminders regardless of metacognitive 
error, participants in Experiment 2 were unbiased as long as metacognitive advice was 
provided. How might this difference be explained? One possibility is that participants 
had a financial incentive to behave optimally in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 3. 
Therefore, in order to remove reminder bias it may be necessary to ensure the removal 
of metacognitive error and to provide a strong incentive to behave optimally according to 
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the reward structure of the task, otherwise a preference to avoid cognitive effort might 
prevail. A second possibility is that participants in the advised group of Experiment 2 
had a reduced cognitive load, in the sense that they could always default to the advised 
option rather than performing a cost-benefit analysis on every trial. Participants might 
choose more optimally under conditions of low cognitive load, however in the context of 
higher cognitive load it may be more rational to choose options that minimise further 
cognitive load. This would be consistent with the “meta-decision making” framework 
proposed by Boureau et al. (2015). Regardless of the explanation of this discrepancy 
between Experiments 2 and 3, our results show 1) that metacognitive error is one factor 
that can influence reminder bias, and 2) that reminder bias cannot be explained by 
metacognitive bias alone. Thus, even though reminder bias cannot be exhaustively be 
explained by metacognitive error, it is nevertheless important to consider the role of 
metacognitive factors in effort allocation. For example, the reminder bias in Experiment 
3 was more than doubled  by metacognitive interventions that influenced participants’ 
confidence. These results imply that individuals may sometimes fail to expend cognitive 
effort not due to an intrinsic bias against doing so, but rather as a result of failing to 
adequately predict the positive outcomes that would be expected to arise from self-
performance (cf Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013).  
As well as metacognitive bias, another possible source of bias towards external 
reminders is a preference to avoid variability in performance. That is, participants might 
avoid an internal memory strategy because it results in higher variability in accuracy, even 
in situations where it results in higher mean accuracy as well. This would be consistent 
with recent research showing that participants are risk-averse with respect to mental 
effort, preferring a fixed amount of effort to a variable amount, even when the mean is 
matched (Apps, Grima, Manohar, & Husain, 2015). While this seems plausible, we have 
no direct evidence for this possibility. Nor can this account explain the relationship 
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between metacognitive bias and reminder bias in Experiments 2 and 3, or the effect of 
providing metacognitive advice.  
In the present study, participants were underconfident about their internal 
memory abilities (apart from the Easy, Positive group in Experiment 3) and over-used 
reminders. Underconfidence is the pattern generally found in laboratory studies of 
prospective memory (Gilbert, 2015b; Meeks et al., 2007; Rummel, Kuhlmann, & Touron, 
2013; Schnitzspahn et al., 2011). However, in other situations individuals' metacognitive 
judgements (and hence cost/benefit decisions) may be biased in the opposite direction, 
potentially including naturalistic prospective memory tasks executed in everyday life. This 
might especially be the case if the time and/or effort cost of setting reminders is larger 
than the minimal cost incurred here. The experimental tasks used here clearly differ from 
naturalistic prospective memory in several respects. One obvious difference is that the 
interval between encoding and retrieving intentions was just a few seconds in the present 
study, but everyday prospective memory unfolds over a much wider timescale. This 
could lead to overconfidence in naturalistic prospective memory tasks, seeing as 
individuals may underestimate the way that intentions currently maintained at a high level 
of activation may fade over time. Another difference between the present tasks and 
naturalistic PM is that the experimental task was extremely difficult, with participants 
only achieving approximately 50% accuracy using their own memory. Even in the 
absence of reminders, many naturalistic PM tasks will have higher chances of success 
than this. Previous studies suggest that underconfidence is particularly pronounced in 
more difficult tasks (Cherkaoui & Gilbert, 2017; Gilbert, 2015b; though see Rummel et 
al., 2013). Therefore it is possible that individuals would be underconfident in laboratory 
tasks but overconfident in naturalistic ones, which could lead to inadequate use of 
reminders in everyday life. Direct evidence for this possibility comes from a study by 
Devolder et al. (1990), showing that participants were overconfident in a naturalistic PM 
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task (making a series of telephone calls over a 4-week period), in contrast to the 
underconfidence found in the laboratory studies reviewed above. 
As well as differing between tasks, biases might also differ between individuals. 
Indeed, Experiment 1 showed a significant correlation between reminder biases between 
two sessions 2 weeks apart (though it should be noted that the sample size for this 
analysis was relatively low at N=41). This shows that individuals may have idiosyncratic 
biases towards or away from cognitive tools, which may require personalised 
interventions to correct. In addition, biases may differ systematically between different 
groups. For example, individuals with acquired brain injury may fail to update 
metacognitive evaluations of their abilities (acquired through a lifetime of experience) to 
the post-injury reality. This is directly supported by Knight et al. (2005) who found that 
patients with traumatic brain injuries were overconfident about their prospective 
memory performance whereas healthy controls were underconfident. This 
overconfidence could lead to inadequate use of external aids, underlining the importance 
of improving 'insight' during neuropsychological rehabilitation (Cicerone et al., 2000; for 
further discussion see Fleming et al., 2017; Shum, Fleming, Gill, Gullo, & Strong, 2011). 
Conversely, healthy ageing may be associated with an opposite bias, which may be 
associated with underconfidence in one’s memory abilities (Touron, 2015). This could 
confer a compensatory effect, seeing as it would lead to increased use of reliable external 
resources, and hence improved functional outcomes. Such an effect may go some way 
towards explaining the phenomenon that older adults tend to underperform younger 
adults in laboratory prospective memory tasks (where reminders are generally not 
permitted), but perform similarly or better than young adults in naturalistic tasks where 
external resources can be used (Schnitzspahn, Ihle, Henry, Rendell, & Kliegel, 2011). 
However, this phenomenon is likely to be complex and cannot be attributed only to 
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increased use of external aids by older adults (see Maylor, 2008; Phillips, Henry, & 
Martin, 2008 for discussion). 
As a result of these considerations, we do not propose that excessive use of 
reminders and external tools will always be seen, across all tasks, populations, and 
individuals. Rather, we propose that biases may be seen in either direction, due (at least 
in part) to erroneous metacognitive evaluations. Regardless of the direction of the error, 
our results suggest that improving metacognitive calibration may promote effective use 
of cognitive tools, and hence improved functional outcomes in everyday life. As shown 
by Experiment 2, behavioural biases may be mitigated if individuals are provided with 
metacognitive advice and feedback, indicating the likely outcomes of trying to 
accomplish a task using internal cognitive resources alone versus a cognitively extended 
strategy. One particular issue when it comes to naturalistic prospective memory is that 
there is typically a long delay between A) the metacognitive evaluation of one’s memory 
abilities when a strategic decision is made about how to remember an intention, and B) 
the subsequent feedback as to whether that strategy was effective. For example, suppose 
that an individual forms an intention at a particular time and decides that a reminder will 
not be necessary. They may find that they later forget the intention, however this will be 
temporally remote from the original decision and therefore may not present a clear 
learning signal to improve subsequent metacognitive evaluations. It may be particularly 
valuable, therefore, to find methods by which prospective memory success or failure can 
be used to deliver clear feedback with respect to the original metacognitive evaluations 
and strategy choices, as a learning signal to improve future decisions (see Carpenter et al., 
2019 for evidence that training can improve metacognitive judgements). 
In conclusion, we found evidence in this study for strong, stable biases in 
individuals' use of external cognitive tools versus internal resources. These biases are 
predicted by metacognitive beliefs, can be modified by metacognitive interventions, and 
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eliminated by providing metacognitive advice. Understanding the sources of these biases, 
and interventions to mitigate them, can improve functional outcomes as our cognitive 
systems become increasingly enmeshed with external tools and resources. 
 
Context 
This work originated from earlier studies investigating circumstances under which 
participants decide to set external reminders for delayed intentions (Gilbert, 2015a), and 
the metacognitive influences on those decisions (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b). 
We wished to go beyond these earlier studies and develop a paradigm to investigate the 
optimality of offloading decisions. Having established this new paradigm in the present 
article, we consider that the following questions may be of particular interest: 1) Previous 
work has shown that offloading behaviour differs in older adults (Gilbert, 2015a) and 
young children (Redshaw et al., 2018), compared with young adults. To what extent do 
effects such as this reflect a rational response to altered unaided ability to remember, 
versus a shift in the bias towards or away from reminders? 2) What interventions can be 
developed to alter participants’ bias towards or away from cognitive offloading, beyond 
those established in Experiment 3? 3) To what extent are biases towards or away from 
cognitive offloading domain-general versus domain-specific? 4) What light can this 
paradigm shed on the processes by which participants regulate the allocation of cognitive 
effort, and the relationship between these processes and metacognitive evaluations?   
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